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INTRODUCTION
Indigenous custom adoption is an exercise of self-governance over child
welfare. It is the application of Indigenous customary law, on Indigenous land,
by and for Indigenous people. There is an urgent need to strengthen selfgovernance over child welfare, informed by the current Indigenous child welfare
crisis. One can begin to define and understand Indigenous custom adoption by
recognizing divergent ideas of family as well as the basic structure and effects of
settler state adoption. Settler state recognition of custom adoption in each
province and territory is discussed, with particular attention paid to the
deleterious effects of conflating custom adoption and settler state adoption.
Statutory regimes have a role in strengthening Indigenous customary law so long
as the conflation of diverse practices is REJECTED, and recognition is
accompanied by community control and support from government bodies.
Robust statutory recognition of Indigenous custom adoption requires legislation
that respects custom adoption as an exercise of self-governance, with its effects
determined by Indigenous communities and custom.

THE CURRENT INDIGENOUS CHILD WELFARE CRISIS
The urgent need to strengthen self-governance over child welfare must be
understood in the context of the current Indigenous child welfare crisis. A
culturally incompatible, inadequately funded system has been imposed on
Indigenous communities for decades. The current system is informed by
historical and ongoing colonialism. There is “a linear path from colonization
through to the Indian Residential Schools to the Sixties Scoop to today's overrepresentation of Aboriginal children in care.”1 There are three times more
Indigenous children in child welfare care today than there were at the height of
residential schools.2 Child welfare justifies the assertion of control over
Indigenous communities through interventions into Indigenous families. These
Peter Choate & Gabrielle Lindstrom, “Parenting Capacity Assessment as Colonial Strategy” (2017) 37 Can
Fam LQ 45 at 47.
2 Ibid at 56.
1
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interventions are “merely more recent iterations of colonial strategies of removal,
abuse, and theft, not only of Indigenous children, but of their culture and land.” 3
Government attempts to involve Indigenous communities in settler state
child welfare have had minimal success. First Nations child and family services
agencies were developed to keep Indigenous children in their communities;
however, these agencies’ efforts have been stifled by a lack of control and
funding.4 These agencies operate under provincial child welfare legislation and
receive funding from the federal government. The funding they receive is twentytwo percent less than their government counterparts.5 Agencies have little
opportunity to create and implement their own solutions when they must
“operate within a legal straitjacket.”6
There is hope that the recent First Nations Child and Family Caring Society
decision will provoke government action that recognizes the urgent need for selfgovernance over child welfare.7 In the 2016 decision, the Canadian Human Rights
Tribunal found that First Nations children and families living on reserve are
discriminated against in the provision of child and family services by Aboriginal
Affairs and Northern Development Canada (“AANDC”).8 The Tribunal’s
decision states that AANDC’s “design, management and control of the [First
Nations Child and Family Services] Program, along with its corresponding
funding formulas and the other related provincial/territorial agreements have
resulted in denials of services and created various adverse impacts for many First
Nations children and families living on reserves.”9 The Panel found “these
adverse impacts perpetuate the historical disadvantage and trauma suffered by
Aboriginal people, in particular as a result of the Residential Schools system.”10
Lara di Tomasso & Sandrina de Finney, “A Discussion Paper on Indigenous Custom Adoption Part 1:
Severed Connections - Historical Overview of Indigenous Adoption in Canada” (2015) 10:1 First Peoples
Child & Family Rev 7 at 7 [di Tomasso & de Finney, “Part 1”].
4 Cindy Blackstock, “Residential Schools: Did They Really Close or Just Morph into Child Welfare?” (2007)
6 Indigenous LJ 71 at 74.
5 Ashley Smith, “Aboriginal Adoptions in Saskatchewan and British Columbia: An Evolution to Save or
Lose Our Children?” (2009) 25 Can J Fam L 297 at 351-352.
6 Blackstock, supra note 4 at 74.
7 First Nations Child and Family Caring Society of Canada v. Attorney General of Canada (for the Minister of Indian and
Northern Affairs Canada), 2016 CHRT 2, 83 CHRR D/207.
8 Ibid at para 473.
9 Ibid at para 458.
10 Ibid at para 459.
3
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In addition to finding discrimination, the panel ordered AANDC to cease its
discriminatory practices and take measures to redress and prevent them.11
Although there have already been several compliance orders issued against
the government which have not been followed,12 this finding of discrimination
by the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal remains a powerful tool in demanding
Indigenous self-governance over child welfare. The settler state child welfare
system is failing Indigenous children and families. Armed with this decision,
Indigenous communities can continue their fight for increased self-governance
over child welfare.

DIVERGENT IDEAS OF FAMILY
Divergent ideas of family inform the differences between the settler state
child welfare system and the ways in which Indigenous communities govern their
own child welfare. While many Indigenous worldviews value extended kinship,
the Canadian settler state perceives the ideal family form as the heteronormative
nuclear family.13 Dominant ideologies of family and mothering are integrated into
the settler state child welfare system, while Indigenous beliefs and practices are
devalued.14 Generally, within the settler state conception of family, childrearing is
considered the task of the individual mother, who must be a self-sufficient
primary caregiver requiring minimal assistance.15 Any difficulties in childrearing
are attributed to personal deficiencies of the ‘bad mother’ which provides a
justification for state intrusion.16

Ibid at para 481.
Re First Nations Child and Family Caring Society of Canada and Canada (Attorney General), 2016 CHRT 10, 83
CHRR D/266; First Nations Child & Family Caring Society of Canada et al. v Attorney General of Canada
(representing the Minister of Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada), 2017 CHRT 7, 2017 CarswellNat 1792; First
Nations Child & Family Caring Society of Canada et al. v Attorney General of Canada (representing the Minister of
Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada), 2017 CHRT 14, 86 CHRR D/294.
13 Lara di Tomasso & Sandrina de Finney, “A Discussion Paper on Indigenous Custom Adoption Part 2:
Honouring Our Caretaking Traditions” (2015) 10:1 First Peoples Child & Family Rev 19 at 20 [di Tomasso
& de Finney, “Part 2”].
14 Marlee Kline, “Complicating the Ideology of Motherhood: Child Welfare Law and First Nation Women”
(1993) 18 Queen’s LJ 306 at 318.
15 Ibid at 328.
16 Ibid at 319-320.
11
12
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In stark contrast to this, Indigenous children must be understood as being
raised within a community: “any assessment that sees a parent in isolation of that
will be deficient and is only assessing one small part of the support system.”17
The participation of extended kin in childrearing is often insufficiently recognized
by the settler state.18 The role and contributions of extended family are obscured
in favour of an individualized parenting assessment. 19
Concentrating on the individual parent also fails to recognize that their
difficulties have roots in historical and ongoing practices of colonialism. 20 The
focus on individual ‘bad mothers’ “effectively blames First Nation women for the
effects of social ills that are largely the consequence of this history and present.”21
This means settler state child protection does not differentiate between
circumstances a parent can change and factors beyond their control. Neglect is a
particularly insidious ground in this regard. While Indigenous children are less
likely than non-Indigenous children to be reported to child protection authorities
for abuse and exposure to domestic violence, they are twice as likely to be
reported for neglect.22 This overrepresentation is attributed to caregiver poverty,
poor housing, and substance misuse.23 Indigenous children are being removed
from their families due to manifestations of systemic inequality beyond their
parents’ control. Child protection assessments within the settler state system
operate as “a repetitive circle where risk is assessed based upon current
expressions of colonialism.”24
Many Indigenous worldviews emphasize community involvement in dealing
with factors outside the individual parent’s control.25 Rather than considering
poverty a reason to remove a child, it can act as “a signal to society to redistribute
resources.”26 Multiple caregivers are a common way Indigenous children receive
support and connect to their communities.27 Instead of removing children from
Choate & Lindstrom, supra note 1 at 53.
Kline, supra note 14 at 331.
19 Ibid at 332.
20 Ibid at 318.
21 Ibid at 321.
22 Blackstock, supra note 4 at 75.
23 Ibid.
24 Choate & Lindstrom, supra note 1 at 52.
25 Blackstock, supra note 4 at 73.
26 Ibid.
27 Choate & Lindstrom, supra note 1 at 54.
17
18
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their homes because of perceived personal deficiencies of their parents,
caregiving responsibilities are shared between community members in a way that
acknowledges root causes and systemic challenges. While the settler state
understands the family as an atomistic unit, many Indigenous worldviews favour
a communal understanding. The use of extended kin in childrearing does not
demonstrate deficiencies in Indigenous families, it demonstrates the ongoing
resilience of Indigenous communities.28 When Indigenous communities govern
their own child welfare, their ideas of the family and traditional caregiving
practices can be honoured.

SETTLER STATE ADOPTION
It is important to acknowledge that many Indigenous children remain in
institutional or long-term foster care with little prospect of adoption.29 While the
statistics for long-term foster care for Indigenous children have skyrocketed, the
statistics for transracial adoptions have plummeted.30 Even if the child does
receive an adoption placement, the rate of Indigenous adoption “breakdowns”
(the child leaving the home before the age of majority) is currently at ninety-five
percent.31 This breakdown rate has largely been attributed to “feelings of loss,
shame, disconnection, and abandonment surrounding identity and kinship”,
particularly when placed in non-Indigenous homes.32
Settler state adoption has, until recently, meant a forced, external, and closed
process.33 Closed adoptions of Indigenous children into non-Indigenous families
“effectively ruptured the transfer of ancestral knowledge, culture, and
language.”34 These severed connections have inter-generational impacts.35 Now,
Canada is seeing a move towards more open adoption procedures and regimes.36
Ibid at 50.
Raven Sinclair, “Identity Lost and Found: Lessons from the Sixties Scoop” (2007) 3:1 First Peoples Child
& Family Rev 65 at 68.
30 Ibid.
31 Smith, supra note 5 at 332.
32 di Tomasso & de Finney, “Part 1”, supra note 3 at 11.
33 Ibid at 9.
34 Ibid at 10-11.
35 Ibid at 11.
36 Cindy L. Baldassi, “The Legal Status of Aboriginal Customary Adoption Across Canada: Comparisons,
Contrasts, and Convergences” (2006) 39 UBC L Rev 63 at 99.
28
29
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However, the important distinction must be made between open records and
open adoption.37 Open records focus on information disclosure, while open
adoption emphasizes maintaining connection with the birth family. The
important distinction between these two concepts is often obfuscated.
There is now also increased awareness of the importance of cultural
planning for Indigenous adoptees, but cultural planning carries the risk of
reduction and essentialism.38 While cultural planning can be a useful tool,
stereotypical cultural planning may “amplify disconnection and shame in foster
and adoptive placements by trivializing the child’s Indigenous culture and
disregarding diversity within and among Indigenous societies.”39

INDIGENOUS CUSTOM ADOPTION
Indigenous custom adoption is often conflated with settler state adoption,
but there are significant differences between the two which must be understood.
Settler state adoption severs family ties. The adoption process terminates the birth
parents’ legal rights and obligations and assigns them to new parents.40 Settler
state adoptions are intended to be permanent.41
Self-governance is strengthened through the resurgence of Indigenous
customary law. Custom adoption must be defined by Indigenous communities.
To assist comprehension of how custom adoption differs from settler state
adoption, some common characteristics must be defined. Custom adoption
should be understood from within Indigenous worldviews and their ideas of the
family. In this section, settler state recognition of custom adoption is discussed
and the potential to conflate custom adoption with settler state adoption is
highlighted and cautioned against.

Jeannine Carriere & Sandra Scarth, “Aboriginal Children: Maintaining Connections in Adoption” in Ivan
Brown et al, eds, Putting a Human Face on Child Welfare: Voices from the Prairies (Regina: Prairie Child Welfare
Consortium/Centre of Excellence for Child Welfare, 2007) 203 at 212.
38 di Tomasso & de Finney, “Part 1”, supra note 3 at 13.
39 Ibid at 14.
40 Baldassi, supra note 36 at 66-67.
41 Quebec, Report of the Working Group on Customary Adoption in Aboriginal Communities, (Quebec: Government
of Quebec, 2012) at 33 [Working Group Report].
37
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Defining and Understanding

Indigenous custom adoption is a broad term referring to caregiving practices
of diverse Indigenous communities.42 Custom adoption is also known as
customary, cultural, or traditional adoption.43 The term ‘adoption’ is imperfect;
Indigenous languages typically have no equivalent word since Indigenous
caregiving practices do not sever children from their birth families and
communities.44 Some Elders find the term unacceptable due to the connotation
of permanent removal of children from their communities.45 Although a loaded
and contested term, custom adoption is intended to convey “Indigenous
alternatives to the wholesale separation of families and communities that has been
perpetrated throughout colonial settler states.”46 The term has been useful for
settler state comprehension, but has also become a stumbling block when
inaccurate understandings of custom adoption infuse government recognition.47
Special attention must be paid to the differences between settler state adoption
and custom adoption to prevent inaccurate understanding and conflation of the
two practices.48
Indigenous custom adoption differs from settler state adoption in four
important ways. Four important features of Indigenous custom adoption include:
1. They often involve kin and rarely involve strangers;
2. They are about kin and community relationships rather
than parenthood;
3. The needs of the children, adults, and relatives are all
considered; and

di Tomasso & de Finney, “Part 2”, supra note 13 at 20.
Ibid at 19.
44 Ibid at 19-20.
45 Marilyn Poitras & Norman Zlotkin, “An Overview of the Recognition of Customary Adoption in Canada”
(Saskatoon: Saskatchewan First Nations Family and Community Institute Inc., 2013) at 24.
46 di Tomasso & de Finney, “Part 2”, supra note 13 at 20.
47 Working Group Report, supra note 41 at 21-22.
48 Ibid at 22.
42
43
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4. Agreements are developed jointly by the birth and
adoptive families, with continued contact between all parties
encouraged.49
Rather than severing ties, custom adoption strives to strengthen relationships.50
Custom adoption is utilized in diverse circumstances for myriad reasons.
Although some arrangements may become permanent out of necessity, the
concept of permanency is not emphasized.51 Custom adoptions are frequently a
temporary form of reciprocal caregiving.52 A variety of alternative parenting
arrangements may be put in place to address the needs of children, families, and
the community.53 They may be used to ensure children are adequately cared for
and receive traditional knowledge from elders and community members.54 The
birth family is temporarily relieved from childrearing responsibilities and the child
will be able to receive support and provide assistance in the adoptive home.
Fundamentally, it is “a positive rather than a reactive intervention.”55 The
Indigenous child and a wide web of community members cultivate trusting
relationships and gain greater understanding of reciprocal care and community
responsibility.56

Federal Legislation: The Indian Act and Bill C-92
The federal Indian Act defines ‘child’ as including “a legally adopted child
and a child adopted in accordance with Indian custom.”57 Children adopted
through either process can be granted official Indian status. 58 This recognition of
custom adoption in the definition section has not been interpreted as providing
any additional adoption rights that would give rise to federal paramountcy over
provincial legislation.
Bill C-92: An Act respecting First Nations, Inuit and Métis children, youth and
families (the “Act”) was tabled in the House of Commons on April 29, 2019. It
di Tomasso & de Finney, “Part 2”, supra note 13 at 21.
Ibid.
51 Poitras & Zlotkin, supra note 45 at 23-24.
52 di Tomasso & de Finney, “Part 2”, supra note 13 at 21.
53 di Tomasso & de Finney, “Part 1”, supra note 3 at 15.
54 di Tomasso & de Finney, “Part 2”, supra note 13 at 23.
55 Working Group Report, supra note 41 at 29.
56 di Tomasso & de Finney, “Part 2”, supra note 13 at 23.
57 Indian Act, RSC 1985 c I-5, s 2(1).
58 Baldassi, supra note 36 at 87.
49
50
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received royal assent on June 21, 2019 but is not yet in force. The purpose of the
Bill is to “affirm the rights and jurisdiction of Indigenous peoples in relation to
child and family services and to set out principles applicable, on a national level,
to the provision of child and family services in relation to Indigenous children.”59
Clause 9 provides that the Act is to be administered in accordance with the
principles of the best interests of the child, cultural continuity, and substantive
equality. Clause 11 provides that child and family services are to be administered
in a manner that:
a) Takes into account the child’s needs, including with
respect to his or her physical, emotional and psychological
safety, security and well-being;
b) Takes into account the child’s culture;
c) Allows the child to know his or her family origins; and
d) Promotes substantive equality between the child and
other children.60
Clause 4 reads “[F]or greater certainty, nothing in this Act affects the
application of a provision of a provincial Act or regulation to the extent that the
provision does not conflict with, or is not consistent with, the provisions of this
Act.”61 It is not entirely clear how conflicts and inconsistencies between
provincial law, Indigenous law, and the Act will be defined and resolved. Clause
22 provides that where a conflict or inconsistency exists between the Act or
provincial legislation regarding child and family services and the laws of an
Indigenous group, the law of the Indigenous group prevails. However, this
paramountcy of Indigenous law is curtailed by clause 23, which dictates that if
the Indigenous law would be contrary to the best interests of the child, it does
not apply. Clause 10 enumerates the factors to be considered in determining the
“best interests of Indigenous child.” These include:

Canada, Department of Justice, “Bill C-92: An Act respecting First Nations, Inuit and Métis children, youth and
families”, (29 April 2019), online: <https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/csj-sjc/pl/charter-charte/c92.html>.
60 Bill C-92, An Act respecting First Nations, Inuit and Métis children, youth and families, 1st Sess, 42nd Parl, 2019, cl
11, (assented to 21 June 2019), SC 2019, c 24.
61 Ibid, cl 4.
59
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a. The child’s cultural, linguistic, religious and spiritual upbringing and
heritage;
b. The child’s needs, given the child’s age and stage of development, such
as the child’s need for stability;
c. The nature and strength of the child’s relationship with his or her parent,
the care provider and any member of his or her family who plays an
important role in his or her life;
d. The importance to the child of preserving the child’s cultural identity and
connections to the language and territory of the Indigenous group,
community or people to which the child belongs;
e. The child’s views and preferences, giving due weight to the child’s age
and maturity, unless they cannot be ascertained;
f.

Any plans for the child’s care, including care in accordance with the
customs or traditions of the Indigenous group, community or people to
which the child belongs;

g. Any family violence and its impact on the child, including whether the
child is directly or indirectly exposed to the family violence as well as the
physical, emotional and psychological harm or risk of harm to the child;
and
h. Any civil or criminal proceeding, order, condition, or measure that is
relevant to the safety, security and well-being of the child.
Subclause 10(4) indicates that these factors, to the extent possible, are to be
interpreted in a manner consistent with the laws of the Indigenous group to which
the child belongs.62 This provides at least some assurance that the Legislature’s
conception of the best interests of the child will not override those of the child’s
community.
When Bill C-92 was first made public in February 2019, Assembly of First
Nations national Chief Perry Bellegarde offered his praise of it. However, several
First Nations chiefs in B.C., Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Ontario have since
criticized the Bill, fearing that it fails to respect the First Nations’ sovereignty. 63
Ibid, cl 10(4).
“First Nations chiefs call for protests to oppose Indigenous child welfare bill”, CBC News (8 May 2019),
online: <www.cbc.ca>.

62
63

40

STATUTORY RECOGNITION OF INDIGENOUS CUSTOM ADOPTION

Vol. 28

One major concern is that it does not provide for any commitment to fund
existing First Nations child and welfare services. It also perpetuates the ineffective
tripartite funding discussions between provincial governments, the federal
government, and Indigenous communities which have previously resulted in
“jurisdictional hot-potato” whereby both federal and provincial governments fail
to provide funding to Indigenous communities.64 Also lacking are provisions
regarding mechanisms to ensure federal and provincial compliance with the
legislation and regulations as well as a system for data collection and reporting,
which would be essential to determining whether or not the new legislation is in
fact effective in achieving its purpose of lowering apprehension rates.65 Pam
Palmater wrote in an article of April 5 that the Act risks “continuing the status
quo.” She critiques that “what is offered is delegated authority under federal
jurisdiction, which is conditional on agreement with the provinces.” She further
elucidates that First Nation jurisdiction and laws in relation to child welfare are
limited extensively by the legislation, severely diminishing its potential to truly
recognize First Nations’ inherent right to self-government.66
While the effect of the Act is yet to be seen, several provinces and territories
have already recognized custom adoption in various ways. The impact of these
various forms of recognition is surveyed below. As indicated above, as long as
the provincial and territorial statutory regimes are not in conflict with or
inconsistent with the federal Act, they remain operative.

Northwest Territories
The Northwest Territories was the first jurisdiction to recognize custom
adoption through legislation. Prior to statutory recognition, families sought
recognition from the courts. Much of the early jurisprudence on custom adoption
is from the Northwest Territories, starting in 1961 with the Territorial Court
decision Re Katie’s Adoption Petition.67
Naiomi Walqwan Metallic et al, “Special Report—An Act Respecting First Nations, Inuit and Métis
Children, Youth and Families: Does Bill C-92 Make the Grade?” Yellowhead Institute (21 March 2019),
online: <https://yellowheadinstitute.org/bill-c-92-analysis/>.
65 Ibid.
66 Pamela Palmater, “Bill C-92’s Indigenous child welfare act risks continuing the status quo” (5 April 2019)
rabble.ca (blog), online: <http://rabble.ca/blogs/bloggers/indigenous-nationhood/2019/04/bill-c-92sindigenous-child-welfare-act-risks>.
67 Re Katie’s Adoption Petition, [1961] NWTJ No. 2, 32 DLR (2d) 686.
64
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In Re Katie’s Adoption Petition, Justice Sissons recognizes “adoptions in
accordance with Indian or Eskimo custom” as having the same effect as an
adoption made under the Child Welfare Ordinance.68 Justice Sissons states that
“although there may be some strange features in Eskimo adoption custom which
the experts cannot understand or appreciate, it is good and has stood the test of
many centuries and these people should not be forced to abandon it.”69 He
explains that these applications are made to the court “because the white man
says there should be an adoption order, and because it is well to have something
of court record establishing the adoption and proving it for purposes of family
allowances, school registration, succession, and to avoid dispute or question.” 70
In the 1972 Territorial Court decision Re Deborah E4-789, Justice Morrow
describes custom adoption as “the most outstanding characteristic of their culture
and appears to outrank marriage and hunting rights.”71 Justice Morrow explains
that there is always a reason for custom adoptions “based on good sense”,
providing examples ranging from ill health or lack of caregiving capability of the
birth mother to the desire of extended kin to raise a child.72 He says “the white
culture could learn a lot from these customs - the Eskimos have what we are
trying to legislate.”73
The “good sense” of custom adoption was incorporated into Justice
Marshall’s precedential summary in the 1983 Northwest Territories Supreme
Court decision Re Tagornak.74 Justice Marshall lists criteria to be applied by the
court when a custom adoption case comes before it:
a) that there is consent of natural and adopting parents; b) that
the child has been voluntarily placed with the adopting parents;
c) that the adopting parents are indeed native or entitled to rely
on native custom; and d) that the rationale for native custom
adoptions is present in this case as in Re Deborah.75

Ibid at 687.
Ibid.
70 Ibid at 688.
71 Re Deborah E4-789, [1972] 3 WWR 194 at para 19, (sub nom Re Tucktoo and Kitchooalik) 27 DLR (3d) 225.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid.
74 Re Tagornak, [1984] 1 CNLR 185 at para 12, 23 ACWS (2d) 469.
75 Ibid.
68
69
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Custom adoption was recognized by statute in 1995 when the Aboriginal
Custom Adoption Recognition Act (“ACARA”) came into force.76 This statutory
model is an administrative model with a registration system as opposed to a
judicial model.77 After gathering biographical details about the child and
statements from the adoptive parents and any other interested person, an
adoption commissioner issues a certificate recognizing the adoption.78 This
recognition does not allow custom adoptions to take place, it only records that
they have occurred.79 The preamble describes the purpose of the ACARA as
“desiring, without changing aboriginal customary law respecting adoptions, to set
out a simple procedure by which a custom adoption may be respected and
recognized.”80
The Northwest Territories Supreme Court discusses the effect of a custom
adoption registration in the 2015 decision Tinqui v Nitsiza.81 Justice V.A. Schuler
states that while the ACARA “provides a means of recognizing a custom
adoption; it does not specify the consequences of such adoptions.”82 However,
she explains that the status of parent and child are clearly contemplated by the
act. Section 2(2)(b) of the act requires “a statement by the adoptive parents,” and
the prescribed form of custom adoption certificate under section 3(2) refers to
the child having been adopted by the adoptive parents “as their child” in
accordance with Aboriginal customary law.83 Custom adoption is understood by
this legislation as creating a parent-child relationship, making the consequence of
custom adoption registration a change in parent and child status.
The ACARA has a role in strengthening Indigenous self-governance over
child welfare. Moving away from the conflation with settler state adoption seen
in early jurisprudence, the ACARA sets out a simple procedure to respect and
recognize custom adoption without changing customary law. To provide legal
consequences to the registration of custom adoptions, the court has interpreted
Aboriginal Custom Adoption Recognition Act, SNWT 1994, c 26 [ACARA].
Poitras & Zlotkin, supra note 45 at 45.
78 ACARA, supra note 76, ss 2(1), 2(2).
79 Working Group Report, supra note 41 at 44.
80 ACARA, supra note 76, Preamble.
81 Tinqui v Nitsiza, 2015 NWTSC 71, 266 ACWS (3d) 119.
82 Ibid at para 20.
83 Ibid.
76
77
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custom adoption certificates as changing parent and child status. While this
interpretation is typically in line with how Indigenous communities understand
the effects of custom adoption, attention must be paid to Indigenous peoples’
own understanding of their customary laws. It is important that the court defers
to Indigenous communities’ understanding of custom adoption and its effects by
maintaining family ties and rejecting the requirement of permanency. To respect
customary law and custom adoption as an exercise of self-governance over child
welfare, application of the ACARA must fulfil its purpose to respect and
recognize custom adoption and refrain from prescribing legal consequences
without involving Indigenous communities.

Nunavut
When Nunavut was established in 1999, all Northwest Territories legislation
then in force became the independent statutes of Nunavut.84 Nunavut has not
chosen to change the ACARA.85 The same registration system applies in the
Northwest Territories and Nunavut. Nunavut has the highest incidence of
custom adoption in Canada.86 From 2008 to 2015, eighty-five to ninety-nine
percent of total annual adoptions were custom adoptions registered under the
ACARA.87
The 2002 Nunavut Court of Justice decision K (SK) v S (J) was the first
opportunity for Nunavut to interpret and apply the recognition legislation.88 The
court heard evidence from Elders about the tradition of custom adoption and
how the process has become “diluted” as a result of “rapid cultural changes taking
place in Northern communities.”89 Justice B.A. Browne described the common
indicators of custom adoption that differentiate it from settler state adoption,
including the continuing relationship between the birth parents and the child, and
the possibility of the child returning to them.90 The substance of a custom
adoption is the intention of the two sets of parents and their agreement regarding
Working Group Report, supra note 41 at 45.
Duplicated for Nunavut by s 29 of the Nunavut Act, SC 1993, c 28.
86 Baldassi, supra note 36 at 64.
87 A (I) (Guardian of) v K (S), 2017 NUCJ 5 para 18, 277 ACWS (3d) 552 [A (I)].
88 K (SK) v S (J), 2002 NUCJ 2, 170 ACWS (3d) 846.
89 Ibid at paras 15, 24, 46.
90 Ibid at para 51.
84
85
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childrearing responsibilities.91 Justice B.A. Browne explains custom adoption as
“part of the community process - an informal way a community looks after
itself.”92
The 2017 Nunavut Court of Justice decision A (I) (Guardian of) v K (S)
provided an opportunity to “draw stark attention to continuing issues presented
by the application of ACARA.”93 In this case, all parties agreed the Custom
Adoption Certificate in question “should be vacated on the basis that the
fundamental concept of procedural fairness of notice to interested parties was
breached.”94 Due to a misunderstanding, a paternal grandmother applied for and
was wrongly issued a Custom Adoption Certificate for her infant
granddaughter.95 The Custom Adoption Commissioner was unable to contact
either the mother or the maternal grandparents “because she did not have
sufficient minutes on her cell phone to call them.”96 As explained by Justice S.
Cooper, procedure for the Commissioner to follow is not provided in the
ACARA or its regulations, and the Custom Adoption Commissioner’s Manual is
“nothing more than a guide to filling out forms.”97 Lack of procedure, training,
and resources (evidenced by reliance on personal funds for telephone charges)
were highlighted in this case.98 Justice S. Cooper echoes recommendations made
by the Nunavut Law Reform Commission regarding custom adoption:
standardized policy, increased documentation, and notice to interested parties
and written consents are all needed.
Nunavut’s interpretation and application of the ACARA has been
promising for strengthening self-governance over child welfare. The court
recognizes the effects of custom adoption as distinct from settler state adoption,
not requiring sameness for recognition. Custom adoption is understood as part
of the way a community looks after itself. The jurisprudence also highlights the
urgent need for increased support and funding to ensure application of the
Ibid at para 17.
Ibid at para 38.
93 A (I), supra note 87 at para 75.
94 Ibid at para 69.
95 Ibid at paras 4-6.
96 Ibid at para 8.
97 Ibid at para 39.
98 Ibid at para 44.
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ACARA is successful. Robust statutory recognition is only the first step.
Standardized procedure, training, and resources must accompany statutory
recognition.

British Columbia
Prior to British Columbia’s statutory recognition of custom adoption, the
1993 BC Court of Appeal decision Casimel v Insurance Corp. of British Columbia
determined that custom adoption was a section 35 Constitutional right.99 The
custom adoption at issue was considered “an integral part of the distinctive
culture of the Stellaquo Band of the Carrier People (though, of course, other
societies may well have shared the same custom or variations of that custom).”100
British Columbia gave statutory recognition to custom adoption in 1996
through a provision in its Adoption Act.101 The provision provides a judicial model,
as opposed to an administrative model.102 Section 46(1) states, “On application,
the court may recognize that an adoption of a person effected by the custom of
an Indian band or aboriginal community has the effect of an adoption under this
Act.”103
This provision was first interpreted and applied in the 1998 BC Supreme
Court decision Re British Columbia Birth Registration No. 1994-09-040399.104 Justice
Grist uses the four factors set out in the 1983 Northwest Territories Supreme
Court decision Re Tagornak as the criteria for declaration of an adoption by
Aboriginal custom:
a) that there is consent of natural and adopting parents; b) that
the child has been voluntarily placed with the adopting parents;
c) that the adopting parents are indeed native or entitled to rely
on native custom; and d) that the rationale for native custom
adoptions is present.105

Casimel v Insurance Corp. of British Columbia, [1993] BCWLD 2373, 106 DLR (4th) 720.
Ibid at para 52.
101 Adoption Act, RSBC 1996, c 5, s 46.
102 Poitras & Zlotkin, supra note 45 at 45.
103 Adoption Act, supra note 101, s 46(1).
104 Re British Columbia Birth Registration No. 1994-09-040399, [1998] 4 CNLR 7, 45 RFL (4th) 458 [Birth
Registration].
105 Ibid at paras 11, 22.
99
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Justice Grist interprets recognition under this provision as requiring that “the
relationship created by custom must be understood to create fundamentally the
same relationship as that resulting from an adoption order under Part 3 of the
Act.”106 The BC Supreme Court discusses this fifth “fundamentally the same
relationship” criteria in the 2000 decision Prince v Canada.107 Justice Meiklem
explains that while the recognition provision “does not require proven symmetry
between the effects of adoption by aboriginal custom adoption and adoption
under the Act as a prerequisite for the declaration contemplated, the Court must
obviously be satisfied that it is recognizing an adoption already effected, and not
creating a fundamentally different relationship or status.”108 To satisfy the court
that custom adoption has created “fundamentally the same relationship”, the
applicant will have to establish “both the nature of the custom generally, and that
the adoption of the applicant pursuant to that custom was effected.”109
BC’s recognition of custom adoption is problematic in its conflation of
Indigenous custom adoption with settler state adoption. The effects of custom
adoption frequently differ from those generated by settler state adoption. Two of
the most significant differences are that custom adoption rarely severs family ties
and permanency is not emphasized.110 Settler state adoption and custom adoption
will not always “create fundamentally the same relationship.”111 The
interpretation in Prince provides some nuance by not requiring “proven
symmetry” between the effects of custom adoption and settler state adoption, but
then affirms the “fundamentally the same relationship” language. 112 Recognition
that fails to incorporate differences between the two forms of adoption does not
adequately respect custom adoption as an exercise of Indigenous self-governance
over child welfare. This sameness requirement also contradicts early
jurisprudence recognizing custom adoption as a section 35 Constitutional right.
Indigenous communities must be able to determine the effects of custom
adoption as distinct from settler state adoption.
Ibid at para 15.
Prince v Canada, 2000 BCSC 1066 paras 38-40, 97 ACWS (3d) 1148 [Prince].
108 Ibid at para 38.
109 Ibid at para 40.
110 Poitras & Zlotkin, supra note 45 at 23-24.
111 Birth Registration, supra note 104 at para 15.
112 Prince, supra note 107 at paras 38-40.
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Yukon
Yukon recognized custom adoption in 2008 through a provision in the Child
and Family Services Act.113 This statute provides a judicial model, as opposed to an
administrative model.114 Section 134(1) states: “On application, the court may
declare that there has been an adoption of a person in accordance with the
customs of a First Nation.”115 As a result of the custom adoption, the court may
declare child and parent status, and “further declarations as to rights and
responsibilities as a result of the custom adoption, including the rights and
responsibilities of the birth parents, adoptive parents or the person.”116 These
further declarations are made by relying on Indigenous custom.117 There is not
yet any reported jurisprudence interpreting or applying this provision in the
legislation.
Yukon’s recognition of custom adoption appears more promising than the
recognition in BC’s legislation and jurisprudence. Instead of conflating
Indigenous custom adoption and settler state adoption, this provision
acknowledges and provides for recognition of Indigenous custom adoption’s
distinct effects. Recognition of custom adoption is not contingent upon it being
functionally equivalent to settler state adoption. The court is not limited to
declarations of effects that mirror those of settler state adoption. It is significant
that this legislation provides for continuing rights and responsibilities of birth
parents, which does not sever family ties as in settler state adoption. This
provision has the potential, depending on its interpretation and application in
future jurisprudence, to strengthen Indigenous self-governance over child
welfare.

Nova Scotia
Nova Scotia added a provision to the Children and Family Services Act in 2015
to recognize custom adoption.118 A judicial model is provided, as opposed to an
administrative model. As stated in section 78A(1), “Upon application, the court
Child and Family Services Act, SY 2008, c 1, s 134 [CFSA].
Poitras & Zlotkin, supra note 45 at 45.
115 CFSA, supra note 113, s 134(1).
116 Ibid, ss 134(2), 134(3).
117 Working Group Report, supra note 41 at 46.
118 Children and Family Services Act, SNS 1990, c 5, s 78A.
113
114
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may recognize that an adoption of a person in accordance with the custom of a
band or an aboriginal community has the effect of an adoption under this Act.”119
There is not yet any reported jurisprudence interpreting or applying this section
of the act.
Similar to the BC provision, Nova Scotia’s recognition conflates Indigenous
custom adoption with settler state adoption. Custom adoption will rarely have the
same effect as settler state adoption due to its commonly observed characteristics
of maintaining family ties and rejecting the requirement of permanency. The term
‘may’ could enable this provision to be interpreted in a manner that recognizes
fundamental distinctions between Indigenous custom adoption and settler state
adoption. Since the court has the discretion to recognize that custom adoption
has the effect of adoption under the act, it may also have the discretion to
recognize custom adoption as having distinct effects. However, because of where
‘may’ is located in the provision and how BC’s similar provision has been
interpreted in BC jurisprudence, it is more likely that custom adoption will either
be recognized as having the effect of adoption under the act or will not be
recognized at all. Statutory recognition that requires custom adoption to mirror
settler state adoption does not adequately respect the practice as an exercise of
Indigenous self-governance over child welfare.

119

Ibid, s 78A(1).
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Ontario
Ontario’s revised Child, Youth and Family Services Act recognizes customary
Customary care is defined in this legislation as “the care and supervision
of a First Nations, Inuk or Métis child by a person who is not the child’s parent,
according to the custom of the child’s band or First Nations, Inuit or Métis
community.”121 This legislation provides customary care subsidies to the person
caring for the child upon declaration by the band or community of the customary
care arrangement.122 In child protection proceedings, a society “shall make all
reasonable efforts to pursue a plan for customary care for a First Nations, Inuk
or Métis child.”123 The purposes provision states that “First Nations, Inuit and
Métis peoples should be entitled to provide, wherever possible, their own child
and family services.”124
care.120

Ontario’s revised legislation may be a powerful tool for strengthening
Indigenous self-governance over child welfare. The purposes provision explicitly
acknowledges self-governance over child and family services. Recognizing
customary care acknowledges the often temporary nature of custom adoption,
which does not result in severed family ties. The provision of customary care
subsidies is an important support in ensuring Indigenous communities have the
financial resources to exercise self-governance over child welfare.

Quebec
Quebec recognized custom adoption in 2017 through the assent to Bill 113,
An act to amend the Civil Code and other legislative provisions as regards adoption and the
disclosure of information.125 The effects of Aboriginal customary adoptions are
recognized “when carried out according to a custom that is in harmony with the
principles of the interest of the child, the protection of the child’s rights and the
consent of the persons concerned.”126 Aboriginal customary adoption certificates
are issued by “a person or body domiciled in Quebec and designated by the
Child, Youth and Family Services Act, SO 2017, c 14, Sched 1 [CYFSA].
Ibid, s 2(1).
122 Ibid, s 71.
123 Ibid, s 80.
124 Ibid, s 1(2).
125 Bill 113, An Act to amend the Civil Code and other legislative provisions as regards adoption and the disclosure of
information, 1st Sess, 41st Leg, Quebec, 2017 (assented to 16 June 2017), SQ 2017, c 12.
126 Ibid, Explanatory Notes.
120
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Aboriginal community or nation.”127 The competent authority must not be a party
to the adoption.128 An Aboriginal customary adoption certificate states
biographical information about the child, the family of origin, and the adopters.129
The certificate will also specify any rights and obligations that subsist between the
adoptee and their parent of origin.130 Conditions under Aboriginal custom may
also be substituted for conditions for suppletive tutorship: the temporary
delegation of parental authority to another family member. 131
The Cree Nation responded favourably to the adoption of Bill 113 in their
press release, underlining its support for the collaborative approach to drafting
this legislation.132 The collaborative approach resulted in amendments to the bill,
including measures to recognize temporary customary adoptions.133 As stated by
Dr. Matthew Coon Come, then Grand Chief of the Grand Council of the Crees
(Eeyou Istchee) and Chairman of the Cree Nation Government, “Bill 113 begins
to harmonize provincial adoption legislation with Cree Aboriginal and treaty
rights in relation to adoption matters and reflects the rights of Indigenous Nations
to govern affairs regarding their children.”134
Quebec’s recognition of custom adoption is an encouraging development.
Drafted in consultation with Indigenous communities, the legislation supports
self-governance over child welfare.135 It recognizes the temporary and more
permanent manifestations of custom adoption and the continuing rights and
obligations of the family of origin. The competent authority to issue Aboriginal
customary adoption certificates are designated by Indigenous communities,
providing them some control over custom adoption recognition procedures. The
effects of custom adoption are determined by Indigenous custom, not by
conflation with settler state adoption. Depending on future interpretation and
Ibid, s 7.
Ibid.
129 Ibid, s 3.
130 Ibid.
131 Ibid, s 10.
132 Grand Council of the Crees, Press Release, “Cree Nation Welcomes Customary Adoption into Quebec
Legislation” (16 June 2017), online: Cree Nation Government, <https://www.cngov.ca/wpcontent/uploads/2018/03/gccei-cng-press-release-june-16-2017-cree-nation-welcomes-customaryadoption-into-quebec-legislation.pdf>.
133 Ibid.
134 Ibid.
135 Working Group Report, supra note 41 at 4.
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application, Quebec’s statutory recognition may be effective in strengthening
Indigenous self-governance over child welfare.

Remaining Provinces
The remaining provinces do not recognize custom adoption in their
legislation.
New Brunswick’s Family Services Act discusses adoption of Aboriginal
children in the context of disclosure and retaining Aboriginal rights.136 There is
no mention of custom adoption.
PEI’s Adoption Act makes no mention of Aboriginal children, nor custom
adoption.137 The Child Protection Act makes many references to the adoption of
Aboriginal children, including in the context of notice to bands in child protection
proceedings and best interests of the child.138 However, there is no mention of
custom adoption in this legislation.
Alberta’s Child, Youth and Family Enhancement Act includes many provisions
regarding adoption of Aboriginal children.139 Cultural connection plans are
emphasized but there is no mention of custom adoption.140
Manitoba’s Adoption Act only references Aboriginal children in the context
of disclosure of pre-adoption birth registrations.141 There is no mention of
custom adoption. The Child and Family Services Authorities Act does not recognize
custom adoption but the preamble states “the development and delivery of
programs and services to First Nations, Metis and other Aboriginal people must
respect their values, beliefs, customs and traditional communities.”142
Saskatchewan’s Child and Family Services Act provides for Aboriginal child
welfare agreements.143 The minister may enter into an agreement with a band for
Family Services Act, SNB 1980, c F-2.2.
Adoption Act, SPEI 1992, c 1.
138 Child Protection Act, SPEI 2000, c 3 (2nd Sess.), ss 2(2)(j), 12(3.1), 12(3.2), 13(7), 13(8), 18.1(1)(b),
18.1(2)(b), 24(1.2), 27(1)(a.1), 27(1.1), 27(2)(a.1), 30(2), 32(2), 32(3), 35(1)(b), 37(2), 37(4), 39(2)(b).
139 Child, Youth and Family Enhancement Act, RSA 2000, c C-12, ss 2(p), 52(1)(1.3), 56(1)(1.2), 57.01, 58.1(g),
63(1)(f), 63(3)(e), 70(1)(2.1), 71.1, 74.4(1).
140 Ibid, s 63(1)(f).
141 The Adoption Act, SM 1997, c 47, s 107.5(1).
142 The Child and Family Services Authorities Act, SM 2002, c 35.
143 The Child and Family Services Act, SS 1989-90, c C-7.2, s 61.
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the administration of the act as an agency or for the exercise by the agency of
those powers of the minister pursuant to the act.144 There is no other reference
to Aboriginal children and no mention of custom adoption.
Newfoundland and Labrador’s Adoption Act states that it shall be read and
applied in conjunction with the Labrador Inuit Land Claims Agreement Act, with this
agreement having precedence in the event of conflict or inconsistency. 145 There
is no other reference to Aboriginal children and no mention of custom adoption.
The Children and Youth Care and Protection Act146 and Children’s Law Act147 replicate
the Labrador Inuit rights provision, but again make no further reference to
Aboriginal child and no mention of custom adoption.
Strengthening Self-Governance Over Child Welfare

Above all, custom adoption is a matter of Indigenous governance and
jurisdiction.148 It is the application of Indigenous law on Indigenous land, by and
for Indigenous people. It is “an expression of First Nations self-determination,
self-government and jurisdiction over families, children, identity, culture and
language.”149 While custom adoption does not depend on recognition in
legislation for its existence, recognition of its effects has practical advantages for
parents, children, and communities.150 Robust statutory recognition strengthens
self-governance over child welfare. Statutory recognition supports the resurgence
of Indigenous customary law. Self-governance is strengthened when the
conflation of diverse practices is rejected, and recognition is accompanied by
control and support.

Ibid.
Adoption Act, SNL 2013, c A-3.1, s 3.
146 Children and Youth Care and Protection Act, SNL 2010, c C-12.2, s 3.
147 Children’s Law Act, RSNL 1990, c C-13, s 5.1.
148 Working Group Report, supra note 41 at 135.
149 Ibid at 103.
150 Ibid.
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Resurgence of Indigenous Customary Law
Custom adoption is part of the resurgence of Indigenous customary law. It
is the rejection of the imposition of colonial laws and the assertion of an
Indigenous community’s own customary laws and practices. Custom adoption is
informed by various Indigenous worldviews, which often value extended kin and
community responsibility. Instead of blaming individual parents for personal
deficiencies, Indigenous caregiving practices acknowledge root causes and
systemic difficulties. Rather than severing ties and emphasizing permanency,
custom adoption strengthens community relationships and allows for temporary
arrangements. Indigenous communities use their own laws to govern their own
children-and-kin relations.
While custom adoption does not depend on recognition for its existence,
recognition is a valuable tool in asserting self-governance. As explained by the
prominent Indigenous scholar John Borrows, “Indigenous legal traditions will
more positively permeate our societies if their power is acknowledged by official
state and community institutions.”151 Governments and courts should “help
create the conditions for the more explicit implementation of Indigenous legal
traditions and community values.”152 The settler state should not be at the centre
of Indigenous law resurgence, instead it should supplement work being done in
Indigenous communities.153 It is at the discretion of Indigenous communities to
define and adapt custom adoption to respond to their traditional values and
current needs.154 It is the task of legislatures to give it a place in legislation.155
In the absence of formal recognition, Indigenous custom adoptions exist in
a liminal space. Custom adoptions have always taken place in Indigenous
communities, but their undefined legal status within Canadian law has resulted in
uncertainty, leading to undue complications and obstacles. 156 The settler state has
routinely failed to recognize the participation of extended kin in childrearing as
an expression of self-governance over child welfare.157 Without recognition of
John Borrows, Canada’s Indigenous Constitution (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010) at 178.
Ibid at 180-181.
153 Ibid at 179.
154 Working Group Report, supra note 41 at 125-126.
155 Ibid at 126.
156 Ibid at 101.
157 Kline, supra note 14 at 331.
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Indigenous forms of caregiving, the settler state justifies its intrusion into
Indigenous communities through child protection rationales. Properly
understood as an alternative to settler state child protection, statutory recognition
of custom adoption can prevent state intrusion into Indigenous communities that
are employing their own means of caring for their children. Statutory recognition
of custom adoption provides “an additional measure of legal certainty.”158

Conflation of Diverse Practices Must Be Rejected
Recognition which conflates custom adoption with settler state adoption
must be rejected. Further, reduction of diverse custom adoption practices in
different Indigenous communities to a flattened essentialist form is an
impoverished recognition. If statutory recognition requires custom adoption to
mirror the effects of settler state adoption, it strips it of the fundamental
characteristics that make it an alternative to the incompatible settler state regime.
Requiring assimilation to the settler state regime does not respect custom
adoption as an exercise of Indigenous self-governance over child welfare.
British Columbia and Nova Scotia are two examples of statutory recognition
which conflate custom adoption with settler state adoption. Legislation in both
provinces recognizes custom adoption as having “the effect of an adoption under
this Act.” The jurisprudence in BC goes further in interpreting this provision by
stating custom adoption must “create fundamentally the same relationship” as
settler state adoption.159 These provisions do not understand custom adoption as
a process unique from settler state adoption. Recognition is permitted so long as
Indigenous caregiving mirrors the existing statutory regime. These recognition
provisions fail to recognize and respect custom adoption as self-governance.
Effects of custom adoption must be defined by Indigenous communities and
understood from their worldviews.
Yukon and Quebec are two examples of more promising statutory
recognition. Yukon’s legislation does not limit court declarations to effects that
mirror those of settler state adoption and provides for continuing rights and
responsibilities of the birth parents. Quebec’s legislation also allows for
158
159
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continuing rights and obligations of the family of origin and recognizes the
temporary and more permanent manifestations of custom adoption. These
examples of statutory recognition are more robust in their recognition of custom
adoption as an exercise of self-governance, with its effects determined by
Indigenous communities and custom.
Statutory recognition must also understand the diversity of custom adoption
practices. The effects of custom adoption vary among Indigenous
communities.160 The risk of reduction and essentialism accompanies statutory
recognition. Custom adoption is an exercise of self-governance which will
manifest itself differently depending on the particular Indigenous community and
custom.
Consultation with Indigenous communities is required to prevent both the
conflation of custom adoption with settler state adoption and the reduction of
diverse custom adoption practices to a flattened essentialist form. The objective
of consultation is not to negotiate but to document and analyze.161 Documenting
the specific custom adoption practices in diverse Indigenous communities assists
in crafting appropriate and beneficial legislation.162 Any proposed legislation for
custom adoption recognition must be subject to prior consultation and
collaboration between government authorities and representatives of relevant
Indigenous communities.163
Quebec’s collaborative approach to drafting their legislation is an
encouraging example of placing consultations at the forefront of statutory
recognition. Quebec’s Working Group on Customary Adoption in Aboriginal
Communities held consultations with Indigenous communities to discuss values
and issues surrounding custom adoption.164 The results of the consultations were
“central in the determination of reference points and parameters to guide the
recognition of effects of customary adoptions within and for the purposes of the
Civil Code and other provincial legislation.”165 As discussed in the press release
Working Group Report, supra note 41 at 129.
Ibid at 1.
162 Ibid at 97.
163 Ibid at 135.
164 Ibid at 6.
165 Ibid at 97.
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from the Cree Nation, the collaborative approach to drafting this legislation
resulted in amendments that better reflected distinct forms and effects of custom
adoption.166 Other legislatures should follow Quebec’s collaborative approach in
creating robust statutory recognition of custom adoption which strengthens
Indigenous self-governance over child welfare.

Recognition Must Be Accompanied by Control and Support
Settler state recognition can play an important role in strengthening selfgovernance, but it must be accompanied by support and ceded control. There
can be a fine line between government recognition and government
interference.167 Custom adoption does not require settler state recognition for it
to exist. The role of the settler state must remain limited to after-the-fact
recognition. Recognition cannot be co-opted as a way of interfering with
Indigenous communities and altering their customary law. As explained by John
Borrows, “Governments and courts should not be trusted with more power than
is necessary to create a sphere of recognition and enforcement.”168 Custom
adoption is an exercise of self-governance and Indigenous communities must
remain in control at all stages of the process.
After recognition has been written into legislation, judicial interpretation
and application can be an insidious form of interference with Indigenous custom.
The formal implementation of Indigenous customary law by the courts must not
undermine work being done in Indigenous communities.169 Judicial interpretation
of the effects of custom adoption must be informed by Indigenous custom and
determined by Indigenous communities. It is particularly important that the
judiciary is educated about the differences between custom adoption and settler
state adoption to ensure the risk of conflating them is minimized.
The choice of statutory model also has implications for the risk of judicial
interference. While the judicial model uses the judiciary to determine whether a
custom adoption has occurred and what its legal effects are, the administrative

Grand Council of the Crees, supra note 132.
Working Group Report, supra note 41 at 71.
168 Borrows, supra note 151 at 179.
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model with a registration system minimizes the role of the judiciary. 170 The
Northwest Territories, Nunavut, and Quebec are examples of the administrative
model of statutory recognition. The judiciary still has a role in interpreting the
recognition provisions, but it does not operate as gatekeeper. The administrative
model is more accessible and less expensive for Indigenous communities and
emphasizes their control over the recognition process.
An additional measure of control is the choice of who issues a custom
adoption certificate. Quebec’s legislation provides a promising example by
allowing the competent authority to issue an Aboriginal customary adoption
certificate to be “designated by the Aboriginal community or nation.”171 This
choice in designation works to ensure that the competent authority is well
informed about custom adoption, understanding it as an exercise of selfgovernance, with its effects determined by Indigenous communities and custom.
It is also essential that statutory recognition of custom adoption is
accompanied by support. Financial support is required to ensure that Indigenous
communities can exercise their inherent right to self-governance.172 When an
Indigenous family customarily adopts a child, they are not provided with financial
support to care for the additional child in their household.173 This financial
support must be provided. Along with financial support for individual families
who customarily adopt, broader support is required for development of
Indigenous regimes and mechanisms which may be required to implement a
modern expression of self-governance over custom adoption.174 A lack of
resources, such as housing shortages and poor living conditions, also impacts the
ability of Indigenous communities to exercise self-governance over child welfare.
Financial support is the joint responsibility of the provinces and the federal
government.175 It is crucial that recognition is accompanied by financial support.
The Ontario legislation provides one example of financial support
accompanying statutory recognition. Upon declaration by the Indigenous band
Poitras & Zlotkin, supra note 45 at 45.
Bill 113, supra note 125, s 7.
172 Working Group Report, supra note 41 at 73-74.
173 Poitras & Zlotkin, supra note 45 at 27.
174 Working Group Report, supra note 41 at 73.
175 Ibid.
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or community of a customary care arrangement, a customary care subsidy is made
available to the person caring for the child.176 This provision acknowledges the
ongoing support required beyond mere recognition. Other provinces, territories,
and the federal government should follow the example of Ontario and provide
financial support to Indigenous families and communities exercising selfgovernance over child welfare.
Sufficient funding of the statutory recognition process is also necessary to
ensure that the integrity of custom adoption is not undermined by improper
recognition. The Nunavut case A (I) (Guardian of) v K (S) highlights the need for
adequate funding to ensure application of recognition legislation is successful.177
In A(I) (Guardian of) v K(S), due to inadequate resources and training, a Custom
Adoption Certificate was issued when a custom adoption did not actually
occur.178 All parties to the litigation agreed there had been a misunderstanding
regarding the custom adoption, and the certificate should be vacated since the
Custom Adoption Commissioner did not provide notice to the interested
parties.179 The statutory recognition process cannot strengthen self-governance
over child welfare if it is not adequately funded and administered.

CONCLUSION
In the sphere of child welfare, Canada has already facilitated multiple
regimes that have torn Indigenous families apart and perpetuated the destructive
chokehold of colonialism. In the words of Cindy Blackstock, “Reconciliation to
me is about not having to say sorry a second time.”180 It is time, then, that Canada
adverts to the wisdom that Indigenous communities themselves hold in relation
to child welfare. Custom adoption is an Indigenous alternative to the failing settler
state child welfare system. It is a rejection of imposed colonial laws, which are
incompatible with Indigenous worldviews and their ideas of the family. Custom
CYFSA, supra note 120, s 71.
A (I), supra note 87 at para 44.
178 Ibid at paras 4-6.
179 Ibid at para 69.
180 Interview of Cindy Blackstock by Amnesty International Canada [nd], Amnesty Canada (blog), online:
<https://www.amnesty.ca/blog/reconciliation-means-not-having-to-say-sorry-a-second-timeconversation-with-cindy-blackstock-f>.
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adoption fundamentally differs from settler state adoption by maintaining family
ties and rejecting the requirement of permanency. The role of statutory
recognition in strengthening self-governance over child welfare depends heavily
on whether the recognition conflates custom adoption with settler state adoption.
Custom adoption must be respected as an exercise of self-governance, with its
effects determined by Indigenous communities and custom. When the conflation
of diverse practices is rejected and recognition is accompanied by control and
support, statutory recognition strengthens the resurgence of customary law and
self-governance over child welfare.
Custom adoption is only one aspect of larger self-governance goals. It is
“part of the broader struggle for Indigenous communities’ right to completely
self-govern.”181 Statutory recognition of custom adoption is not enough. Further
recognition of the inherent right to self-governance is necessary for ongoing
reconciliation. Robust statutory recognition of custom adoption may be used as
a tool for Indigenous communities in demanding further recognition of selfgovernance in other areas.
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di Tomasso & de Finney, “Part 2”, supra note 13 at 33.

